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Alcohol and the Motorist:
Practical and Legal Problems
of Chemical Testing
Chemical testing, as a means of determining whether a motor-
ist is "under the influence of intoxicating liquor," has become
widespread during the past quarter-century. The authors of
this Article analyze two basic problems inherent in such test-
ing: (1) the limitations on the accuracy of the tests; and (2)
the possible invasions on constitutional and statutory rights of
individuals resulting from compelled submission to the tests.
They also examine the constitutionality and feasibility of the
so-called implied consent statutes recently enacted in some
states to overcome constitutional barriers proscribing the use
of chemical testing for intoxication.
M. C. Slough*
Paul E. Wilson-
In the days of horseless carriages the problem of the intoxicated
motorist was not of great moment, but with the advent of the mod-
em automobile, incidence of death on the highway attributable to
excessive use of alcohol became a matter of national concern. Legis-
lators fumbled for remedies to halt this wave of senseless killing, and
prosecutors got tough. Yet convictions were difficult to obtain, for
although popular sentiment zealously favored constructive and ef-
fective action, jurors were often hesitant to convict because they
could not be adequately convinced that the persons they were
judging had actually been drunk when the accident occurred.
Today one continues to hear about the threat of the drunken
driver; however, in reality society should be more concerned with
the problem of the drinking driver. One who is dead drunk or grossly
intoxicated will most likely be so anesthetized that he will be unable
to stagger to the steering wheel. However, somewhere between
* Professor of Law, University of Kansas.
*" Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas.
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sobriety and deep intoxication a driver can be "under the influence
of alcohol," and in this critical area of perception loss, the use of
liquor can significantly diminish his coordination and cloud his
judgment. Thus, a motorist's driving ability can be impaired long
before he reaches the state referred to in common parlance as
"intoxication" or "drunkenness."
To obviate unnecessary confusion over a choice of semantics, the
National Conference on Street and Highway Safety, in cooperation
with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, prepared a model act which provides that it shall be unlawful
and punishable for any person under the influence of intoxicating
liquor to drive, or to be in actual physical control of, any vehicle.'
By 1959, forty-five states had also adopted that criterion. 2
However, adoption of such a provision does not eliminate the
practical difficulty of defining the ambiguous phrase "under the in-
fluence." An individual of literal complex will assert that one glass of
beer can exert sufficient influence, whereas an excessive drinker will
deny that a person is under the influence so long as he is able to
recognize the center line of the highway. Opinions at either extreme
are absurd. Obviously, the prosecutor need prove only that the
defendant's faculties are adversely affected by drink, but without
1. UNIFOm VE-ICLE CODE § 11-902(a). (Emphasis added.)
2. ALAsxA Co~ai. LAWS ANN. § 50-5-3 (Supp. 1958); A=z. REV. STAT. ANN. §
28-692(a) (1956); Anx. STAT. ANN. § 75-1027 (1957); CAL. VEmcLE CODE § 502
(Supp. 1959); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4-30(1) (Supp. 1957); CONN. Gm.
STAT. § 14-227 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4111(a) (1953); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 317.20 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-1625(a) (1957); HAwAii REv. LAws§ 311-28 (1955); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 49-329(2) (1957); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951A,§ 144(a) (1959); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2001(b) (1952); IowA CODE § 321.209(2)
(1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-254(2) (Supp. 1959); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 189.520(2) (1955); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:98 (Supp. 1959); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. ch. 22, § 150 (Supp. 1959); MD. ANN. CODE art. 6612, § 206(2) (1957);
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 90, § 24 (1959); MIcH. CoMw. LAWS § 257.625 (Supp. 1956);
MIN. STAT. § 169.121(1) (1957); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8174 (1942); MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. § 32-2142(1) (1959); NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-727 (Supp. 1957); NEV.
REv. STAT. § 484.050 (1959); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 262.19 (Supp. 1957);
N.J. REV. STAT. § 39:4--50 (Supp. 1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-22-2(a) (Supp.
1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138 (1953); N.D. REV. CODE § 39-0801 (Supp. 1957);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (1954); OI.A. STAT. tit. 47, § 93 (Supp. 1959);
Ore. REV. STAT. § 483.992(2) (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 75, § 231(f) (1953);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 31-129(a) (Supp. 1959); S.C. CODE § 46-348 (Supp.
1959); S.D. CODE § 44.0302-1 (Supp. 1952); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59.1031 (1955);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1959); VT. STAT. tit. 23, § 1183 (1959); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18-75 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1721(331) (1955); Wis. STAT.
§ 343.31(b) (1958); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 31-129(a) (1957). Washington
uses the language "under the influence or affected by." WAsH. REV. CODE § 46.56.010
(1952). Texas defines the prohibited condition as "intoxicated or under the influ-
ence." TEx. PEN. CODE art. 802 (Supp. 1959). Only three states use the term
"intoxicated." See ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 2 (Supp. 1955); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564.440
(1953); and N.Y. VEmcLE & TRAFFic LAw § 1192 (Supp. 1959) (supersedes § 70(5),
effective Oct. 1, 1960).
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benefit of factual and concise scientific evidence, even this burden
can become a frustrating obstacle.
Just a quarter of a century ago, the objective-symptom tests were
the sum and substance of the prosecution's armor. The arrested
person underwent an arduous series of motion and speech tests,
which included simple balancing procedures, walking ind turning,
handwriting, picking up coins from the floor, and reciting stock
tongue-twisters such as "Methodist Episcopal" and "Around the
Rugged Rock the Ragged Rascal Ran." Because breath odor was
checked and relied on, invariably the beer drinker suffered more
abuse than he deserved. Many offenders were acquitted because
juries were loath to base convictions upon questionable objective
symptoms and the equally questionable testimony of lay and police
witnesses. On the other hand, diabetics suffering from insulin shock
often failed these objective tests and were easy prey for prosecutors. 3
I. CEm~cAL TEsTS To DETERMINE BLOOD-
ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION
The use of chemistry to aid in diagnosing inebriation was first
proposed in 1914 by Widmark, a Swedish scientist. By 1980, results
of chemical tests were accepted as evidence in Sweden, and in 1934
a law was ado pted in Sweden which made blood tests compulsory
in criminal andtraffic cases.4 Two years later, the German Minister
of the Interior ordered blood tests in suspected inebriation cases.
Committees of the National Safety Council and the American
Medical Association soon recommended adoption of chemical-test
procedures in this country to assist law enforcement officers in inter-
preting and evaluating the usual symptoms resulting from excessive
use of alcohol.5 Medical science established with certainty that the
percentage of alcohol absorbed into the blood and circulated
ough the body is closely correlated with the degree to which a
person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor. And it is possible
to predict accurately the percentage of alcohol in the brain (and
3. Problems of the diabetic are illustrated in a recent opinion by the Supreme
Court of Minnesota, State v. Simonsen, 252 Minn. 315, 89 N.W.2d 910 (1958).
Medical science recognizes more than sixty pathological conditions which may cause
one or more of the symptoms produced by the excessive use of intoxicants. Even a
skilled physician may encounter difficulty in arriving at an accurate diagnosis of
alcoholic influence simply by observing the usual clinical symptoms.
4. Laboratory experiments by the Swedish scientist, Widmark, were in large part
accountable for this enactment. Widmark concluded that when blood-alcohol is
200 mg. % or more, individuals almost without exception are intoxicated. For an
elaborate and scholarly discussion of the various methods of blood testing, see Ladd
& Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication,
24 IowA L. REv. 191 (1939).
5. Report of Committee to Study Problems of Motor Vehicle Accidents of the
American Medical Association, 119 A.M.A.J. 653 (1942).
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hence, degree of "intoxication") by determining the percentage of
alcohol contained in other body substances, namely, the blood,
urine, saliva, or spinal fluid.6 Regardless of the body substance
tested, the result attained can readily be translated into terms of
the percentage of alcohol in the blood.
A. Ranges of Alcoholic Concentration
Blood-chemistry experts now generally recognize that a person
with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.05 per cent or less is not
"under the influence of intoxicating liquor." With a concentration
of 0.05 per cent to 0.15 per cent, many individuals will be "under
the influence," and one evidencing a concentration of more than 0.15
per cent will invariably suffer impairment of driving ability. These
ranges of alcoholic concentration, now well-recognized, have been
incorporated into the Uniform Vehicle Code, which provides:
In any criminal prosecution for a violation of paragraph (a) of this section
relating to driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, the amount of alcohol in the defendant's blood at the time alleged
as shown by chemical analysis of the defendant's blood, urine, breath or
other bodily substance shall give rise to the following presumptions:
1. If there was at that time 0.05 percent or less by weight of alcohol in
the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was not
under the influence of intoxicating liquor;
2. If there was at that time in excess of 0.05 percent but less than 0.15
per cent by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood, such fact shall not
give rise to any presumption that the defendant was or was not under
the influence of intoxicating liquor, but such fact may be considered with
other competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the
defendant;
3. If there was at that time 0.15 percent or more by weight of alcohol in
the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was under
the influence of intoxicating liquor;
4. The foregoingprovisions of paragraph (b) shall not be construed as
limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon
the question whether or not the defendant was under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.7
6. One might suspect that cerebrospinal fluid would furnish reliable evidence of
alcoholic influence; however, the only spinal fluid that does is the cisternal spinal
fluid obtained from the base of the brain. There is a decided delay in passage of
alcohol down the spinal canal to the lumbar region where spinal fluid may be
obtained with comparative safety. Actually, the best evidence of the extent of
alcoholic influence would result from a direct measurement of the alcoholic content
of nerve structures themselves, but for obvious reasons this cannot be effected in
living persons. If the person invblved has been killed in a traffic accident, a coroner
or medical examiner should have discretionary authority to order an appropriate
post-mortem examination which might include a chemical test of body substances
to determine what caused or contributed to the death. Commonwealth v. Capalbo,
308 Mass. 376, 32 N.E.2d 225 (1941); State v. Kelton, 299 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1957).
7. UNn omcr VEHIcLE CODE § 11-902(b). It is a matter of common knowledge
that persons of the same sex, age and weight may evidence a remarkable variability
19603 CHEMICAL TESTING FOR INTOXICATION 677
Similar provisions have been incorporated into the motor vehicle
codes of at least seventeen states.8 But this effort has been criticized
readily, especially by many prosecutors who have encountered diffi-
culty in convicting defendants whose blood-alcohol concentration is
in the middle range; juries tend to require showing of a blood-
alcohol concentration of 0.15 per cent before finding that the ac-
cused is under the influence. This criticism is probably justifiable
for the vast majority of persons evidence marked impairment of
driving ability when the blood-alcohol level reaches even 0.12 or
0.13 per cent.
Serious consideration should be given to a downward revision of,
the present formula, and greater emphasis should be placed upon
corroborating factors inevitably brought to light in borderline cases.
The National Safety Council Committee on Tests for Intoxication
has recently recommended that the lines of demarcation be ampli-
in their responses to intoxicating liquor. Furthermore, it is a well-established fact
that concentrations of blood-alcohol will be much lower among persons who have
developed a tolerance to alcohol than among others, for in tolerant individuals
absorption of alcohol is slower or elimination more rapid. GatnwoEM, LEGAL MEum-
cn 763 (1954). See text following note 21 infra.
8. The following state statutes create presumptions substantially like those found
in the Uniform Vehicle Code: Amz. REv. STAT. Amx. § 28-692(B) (Supp. 1959);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4-30(2) (Supp. 1957); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-1625(b)
(1957); HAwAu Rv. LAWS § 311-29 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-1102(b)
(1957); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 953, § 144(b) (1959); KY. REv. STAT. § 189.520(4)
(1959); Mor. REv. CODE ANN. § 32-2142(2) (Supp. 1959); NEn. BEv. STAT. §
39-727.01 (1943); NEv. REV. STAT. § 484.055 (Supp. 1959); N.J. REv. STAT. § 39:4-
50.1 (Supp. 1959); N.D. 11Ev. CODE § 39-0801 (Supp. 1953); S.C. CODE § 46-344
(1952); S.D. CODE § 44.0302-1 (Supp. 1952); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (Supp.
1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-75.3 (Supp. 1958); WAsH. REv. CODE § 46.56.010
(1952); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 31-129(b) (1957).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 59.1033 (1955) contains only the presumption that one whose
blood contains 0.15% or more alcohol is under the influence thereof. Another group
of state laws uses the quantitative standards employed in the uniform code, but,
within the framework of the statute, the result of the test constitutes prima facie
evidence instead of creating a presumption: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3507 (Supp.
1958); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2003(2) (Supp. 1959); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35,
§ 100(a) (Supp. 1959); M-N. STAT. § 169.121(2) (1957); N.H. 11Ev. STAT. ANN.
§ 262.20 (1955); N.Y. VEmCLE & TaAs-sc LAw § 1192 (superseding § 70(5) effec-
tive Oct. 1, 1960); ORE. 1REv. STAT. § 483.630(1)(5)(a) (1959); W. VA. CODE
AN. § 1721(331a) (Supp. 1959); Wis. STAT. § 325.235 (1958). ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. ch. 22, § 150 (Supp. 1959) differs only in that it provides that 0.07% or less of
alcohol in the blood shall be taken as prima facie evidence that the subject was not
under the influence of intoxicants. Arkansas courts receive results of chemical
analyses as evidence only, Aim STAT. ANN. § 75-1031.1 (1957) giving such evidence
neither prima facie nor presumptive effect. In KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1005
(Supp. 1959), the legislature has uniquely failed to recognize a doubtful area in
which the chemical test should not be given presumptive effect. There, if the test
shows under 0.15% alcohol, the subject is presumed not under the influence, while
a presumption of influence arises with the presence of 0.15% or more of alcohol in
the blood. VT. STAT. § 1189 (Supp. 1959) differs from the Uniform Vehicle Code
only in that there is a conclusive presumption of non-intoxication if the blood-alcohol
content is 0.05% or less.
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fled in the following manner: 0.00 per cent to 0.05 per cent, safe;
0.05 per cent to 0.10 per cent, possibly under the influence; 0.10
per cent to 0.15 per cent, probably under the influence; above 0.15
per cent, definitely under the influence.' This report has recognized
that chemical tests, important and valuable as they are, should not
constitute the sole basis for determining whether a person is under
the influence of alcohol when other evidence is available.10
It is almost universally recognized that the concentration of alco-
hol in the blood provides the best biochemical index of alcoholic
intoxication. The contentions of some writers that brain-alcohol
concentration is not paralleled by blood-alcohol concentration, have
been proved fallacious except for during the first few minutes of
alcoholic absorption following consumption of alcohol.'" Carefully
controlled psychological tests have demonstrated that, within the
limits of normal biological variation, impairment of mental and
physical faculties results from the concentration of alcohol in the
blood coursing through the nerve centers.
B. Comparison of Methods of Obtaining Specimens
The blood test is undeniably accurate, but it is often not prac-
tically feasible in the normal pattern of law enforcement. The draw-
ing of a blood specimen, even though not dangerous, does involve
an invasion of the person as well as the inconvenience incidental
to making the necessary trip to a hospital, clinic, or physician's
office. Furthermore, only a physician, nurse, or qualified medical
technician should be permitted to draw blood, and the services of
9. Notice, however, that even the presumption that one is definitely under the
influence of alcohol is rebuttable. During the years 1948-51, a research project was
conducted at Michigan State University for the National Safety Council. Tests were
run to evaluate the comparability and reliability of chemical tests generally to
determine alcoholic influence. When concentration had reached or exceeded 0.15%,
impairment of driving ability was noted in every case. In a majority of cases, im-
pairment was evident at a figure appreciably below the 0.15% figure.
In other countries, the intoxicated driver is generally treated more severely than
in the United States. In Norway it is presumed that an operator of a motor vehicle
is under the influence of intoxicating liquor when his blood-alcohol level reaches a
mere 0.05%. A driver in Sweden who evidences a blood-alcohol concentration of
0.08% or more is subject to a fine proportionate to his income or may be imprisoned
for a term of not more than six months. The driver who evidences an alcoholic
concentration in excess of 0.15% is punished by imprisonment. Motor vehicle opera-
tors in Denmark are generally found guilty of driving under the influence when
their blood-alcohol levels exceed 0.10%. See REPORT OF PROcEEDiNGS or Fmst INTE=-
NATONAL CONFERENCE ON ALCOHOL AND ROAD TRAFc, STOCxHOLM, SWEDEN 55,
73, 219 (1950).
10. It is highly important that police in making arrests for driving while under
the influence follow a carefully established procedure designed to secure and record
all relevant information procurable by observation and questioning. McCouincK,
EVmENCE § 176, at 377 (1954).
11. GaADwor.L, LEGAL MEDICINE 767 (1954).
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these trained individuals are not always readily available. Moreover,
if there is an appreciable delay between the time of the accident or
arrest and the time of drawing the blood sample, the percentage of
blood-alcohol is likely to drop considerably.
Although one need not be a clinical expert to gather saliva, and
only a small amount is necessary for testing purposes, nevertheless
there is often appreciable delay in receiving the results of the chem-
ist's analysis. As a rule urine tests are satisfactory, but during the
absorptive phase, concentration of alcohol in the secreted urine lags
considerably behind blood-alcohol concentration, because excretion
through the kidneys cannot occur until after the alcohol is absorbed
into the blood, distributed through the aqueous parts of the body,
and carried to the kidneys.'2 All factors considered, the breath test
seems the most pragmatic substance from the standpoint of the
average law enforcement agency's proficiency in obtaining blood-
alcohol specimens. In practical police work, breath analysis serves
a useful purpose in providing easily obtainable specimens and a
quick, reasonable test result to guide the officer. The concentration
of alcohol in the exhaled (alveolar) breath reflects the alcoholic
concentration of the blood circulated through the lungs. Approxi-
mately 2100 volume units of alveolar breath contain the same quan-
tity of alcohol as does one volume unit of circulating blood. How-
ever, the breath test accurately measures the concentration of
alcohol in the circulating blood only if at least fifteen minutes have
elapsed between consuming the last drink and undergoing the
breath test. During this fifteen-minute interval, all traces of alcohol
remaining in the mouth and throat will have been washed down by
saliva.
Presently, there are several types of portable breath-testing units
available, and if tests are properly conducted, each type accurately
measures the concentration of alcohol circulating in the blood. All
available units operate on essentially the same principle, that is,
decolorization of a measured quantity of chemical by alcohol in the
exhaled breath which has been trapped in a rubber balloon. Concen-
tration of alcohol in the breath can be computed from the amount
of breath required to cause the chemical reaction, and from this the
alcoholic content of the person's blood can be ascertained. Among
the perfected devices widely used are the drunkometer,"3 the intoxi-
12. Although saliva and urine are simple substances to collect, frequently during
the emotional disturbance created by arrest or accident, the person will be quite
unable to produce either type of fluid.
13. This testing apparatus was developed by Doctor R. N. Harger, Professor of
Biochemistry and Toxicology at the Indiana University School of Medicine. Doctor
Harger is a noted authority in his field and has written extensively on matters per-
taining to alcoholic intoxication. See, e.g., Harger, Some Practical Aspects of Chemi-
cal Tests for Intoxication, 85 J. Cium. L. C. & P.S. 202 (1944).
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meter,14 the alcometer,' 5 and the breathalyzer; 6 except for scattered
adverse criticism, results obtained through their use appear to be
scientifically acceptable.1
C. Judicial Reliance on Breath Tests
With one outstanding exception, 8 appellate courts have unani-
mously approved the various tests outlined. Approval or acceptance
14. Developed and perfected by Doctor G. C. Forrester, this device follows the
principles of the drunkometer, including the alcohol-carbon dioxide ratio. Magnesium
perchlorate is used rather than the permanganate employed in the drunkometer. For
use in court, the chemical unit must be prepared by a chemist or skilled technician
so that he may testify concerning its ori inal condition as well as to its change
incidental to the test. Only a highly trained individual is qualified to conduct an
analysis with the intoximeter whereas persons with little formal training may
achieve competence in the operation of the drunkometer, alcometer, or breathalyzer.
15. The alcometer utilizes iodine pentoxide as an oxidizing agent. Results are
evaluated in terms of the dependability of the determination of iodine by means of
the starch-iodine color measured photometrically. Developed by L. A. Greenberg
and F. W. Keator of Yale University, this ingenious device is nearly foolproof. How-
ever, the unit does require a constant source of 110-volt alternating current and is
both heavy and expensive. As a rule, therefore, it must be used in police head-
quarters. For purposes of preserving adequate records, some police departments
photograph the apparatus during testing situations, with the meter-reading show"
the blood-alcohol percentage, the officer giving the test, the person being examine,
the clock and the calendar all on one film.
16. The breathalyzer is a relatively new device and was invented by Captain
R. F. Borkenstein of the Indiana State Police Department. A breath sample is passed
through a solution of potassium dichromate and sulphuric acid which reacts with
alcohol. As alcohol is absorbed the solution, normally yellow, changes color; if there
is no alcohol present, no color change occurs.
17. Doctor Haggard and his associates have published a criticism of the drunko-
meter, The Alcohol of the Lung Air as an Index of Alcohol in the Blood, 26J. LAB.
CGU. MF-. 1527 (1941), to which Doctor Harger has replied, "Debunking" the
Drunkometer, 40 J. Csum. L., C. & P.S. 497 (1949).
18. In People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W.2d 322 (1949), the Supreme
Court of Michigan, by drawing an analogy to the ill-fated lie detector, found that
testimony in the record failed to establish that the Harger drunkometer test had
achieved general scientific recognition, and ruled that the admission into evidence of
testimony concerning the drunkometer and the test results constituted reversible
error. Two police officers with limited knowledge of chemistry and a young physician
who had worked as a student assistant to Harger were called by the state as expert
witnesses. The defendant, son of an eminent Detroit pathologist, produced five
outstanding physicians as experts, one of whom (when referring to the drunko-
meter) stated that the "thing works like a slot machine." One of the other defense
experts testified that most of the medical profession considered the method of testing
unreliable. Undoubtedly the defense witnesses were reputable professional men but
it was apparent that their personal contacts with the drunkometer were minimal and
all based their testimony on articles written by authors critical of procedures em-
ployed in the drunkometer test. See DoNIGAN, CHEMICAL TzsTs AND =HE LAw
51 (1957).
In fairness to the Michigan opinion, it should be observed that the court did not
say that the test method employed in any given case must be recognized and ap-
proved by all medical and scientific authorities. Obviously, it would be foolish to
insist that any scientific experiment of this nature must be accepted without exception
or dissent.
The trial scene in People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 99 N.E.2d 567 (1951), an
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does not mean that courts have failed to recognize hints of disagree-
ment in scientific circles, but as a rule courts have considered relia-
bility of the tests to be a matter affecting the weight of evidence
introduced, rather than its admissibility. In practice, test results are
admitted whenever a qualified expert witness testifies that the
particular test method employed is reliable and generally accepted
as such by other experts in the discipline. 9
Although courts have recognized the accuracy of standard testing
procedures and legislative enactments have lent credence to the
conclusion that alcohol has a measurable psychophysical effect upon
the human organism, one cannot overstress the necessity for supply-
ing an adequate foundation before test results are offered in evi-
dence. Each facet of the testing situation should be thoroughly ex-
plained, including the methods employed and the manner in which
the analysis was made.20 If at all possible, one should produce an ex-
action brought in the Municipal Court of Chicago, presents an interesting contrast.
Defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. In his testimony, he admitted that before the collision he had
consumed two glasses of beer, but he denied having had any other intoxicants
through the course of the day. Daniel Dragel, Evidence Evaluator at the Chicago
Crime Detection Laboratory, who operated the drunkometer in the case, testified
that the test disclosed a 0.30% concentration of alcohol in the defendant's blood,
and that in his opinion, the defendant was under the influence of alcohol at
the time of arrest. Doctor Harger also testified for the prosecution as did Doctor
Clarence Muehlberger, a widely known toxicologist. On the basis of this testimony,
the defendant was convicted. And on appeal to the Appellate Court of Illinois, the
conviction was affirmed. The question had never been presented to an Illinois court
of review prior to this decision. The court, while rejecting the opinion in People
v. Morse, supra, relied heavily upon a more recent Texas decision, McKay v. State,
155 Tex. Crim. 416, 285 S.W.2d 173 (1950), which recognized the Harger drunko-
meter as scientifically acceptable. See also People v. Gamier, 20 Ill. App. 2d 492, 156
N.E.2d 613 (1959).
19. "This court may recognize generally accepted scientific conclusions, even
though there should be some who disagree with them. In all probability a scientist
may be found who will disagree with practically every generally accepted scientific
theory." McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 416, 419, 235 S.W.2d 173, 174 (1950).
The following cases are particularly applicable to the problem of expert testimony
and the reliability of the various testing devices: State v. Olivas, 77 Ariz. 118, 267
P.2d 893 (1954); State v. Hunter, 4 N.J. Super. 531, 68 A.2d 274 (1949); Toms v.
State, 95 Okla. Crim. 60, 239 P.2d 812 (1952); Jackson v. State, 159 Tex. Crim.
228, 262 S.W.2d 499 (1953); Annot., 159 A.L.R. 209 (1945).
20. Certified copies of official or unofficial reports concerning test analyses cannot
qualify as adequate evidence to prove the authenticity, accuracy, or results of a
chemical test performed to determine alcoholic influence. One cannot by-pass the
need for testimony by qualified experts in the field, because a written laboratory
report without more is hearsay and inadmissible as evidence. This does not mean
that such records and reports do not serve a useful function, for they may be used
for refreshing recollection, and when maintained in the usual course of business,
are admissible to aid in proving elements of the case which do not involve expert
conclusions and opinions. Estes v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 122, 283 S.W.2d 52 (1955).
It is not absolutely necessary that the expert testifying have conducted every phase
of the chemical analysis personally; if the analysis in question was conducted under
his supervision and control, he is a proper party to testify concerning test results.
State v. Bailey, 184 Kan. 704, 339 P.2d 45 (1959).
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pert witness who can attest not only to the scientific reliability of the
chemical testing procedures followed but also vouch for their correct
administration in the particular case being litigated. In order to qual-
ify as an expert on all phases of the subject, one needs advanced
training in chemistry and some basic training in medicine. Because
of the nature of their training and practical experience, physicians,
biochemists, toxicologists, and medical technologists usually are ac-
cepted as experts. Through training and experience, the ordinary po-
lice officer may learn to competently operate one or more of the
breath-testing devices. Yet, obviously he cannot testify concerning
the quality or strength of chemicals used or the chemical or mathe-
matical formulas employed; nor can he interpret and analyze the
numerical readings which indicate the existence of a given quantity
of alcohol in the blood.2
D. Miscellaneous Limitations on the Accuracy of the Chemical Tests
Prosecutors must be warned of the dangers in assuming that a giv-
en concentration of alcohol will produce substantially the same de-
gree of intoxication in everyone, for individual tolerance and other
subjective factors make this assumption false. An abstainer may per-
form subnormally when his blood-alcohol level reaches a threshold
value of 0.02 to 0.04 per cent. However, as much as 0.08 to 0.09 per
cent blood-alcohol concentration may be required to measurably im-
pair the behavior of a heavy drinker.22
Test results reveal neither the amount of alcohol consumed nor
when the drinking was done, but they do indicate the amount of
alcohol remaining unburned in the blood at the time the specimen
was obtained. Obviously, the prosecutor is most directly concerned
with the percentage of blood-alcohol present at the time of the inci-
dent in question. Although there may be an appreciable time lag be-
tween occurrence of the incident and the time of taking a specimen
for analysis, there is ample authority upholding the admissibility of
expert testimony estimating the percentage of blood-alcohol concen-
tration present at the time of the event on the basis of the results of a
test conducted subsequent to the event. Reliable estimates by expert
witnesses may be made by a mathematical process known as extrapo-
lation. Given a known rate of elimination of blood-alcohol in the aver-
21. Alexander v. State, 305 P.2d 572 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956); Hill v. State, 158
Tex. Crim. 313, 256 S.W.2d 93 (1953); Omohundro v. County of Arlington, 194
Va. 773, 75 S.E.2d 496 (1953). As a rule, an individual who operates an intoximeter
must be a qualified chemist or technician and will therefore be able to testify in
court concerning the chemical phases of the test conducted. Qualifications for opera-
tion of the drunkometer, alcometer and breathalyzer are less exacting, and it is very
likely that the operator himself will be unable to provide adequate information with
respect to scientific principles involved in the testing situation.
22. See note 7 supra.
[Vol. 44:673
19601 CHEMICAL TESTING FOR INTOXICATION 688
0
age person, an expert can reasonably estimate the percentage of
blood-alcohol in the average person at the time of a certain event,
based upon the quantity of alcohol in the blood as shown in the
chemical test. An expert witness may provide a reasonably accurate
estimate of the blood-alcohol concentration of a particular person if
he is given definite facts from which he can determine the rate of
elimination taking place in the individual's body. 3
The admissibility of expert testimony of this type was challenged
in an Indiana case,24 where the problems involved in examination
of the expert witness were typical of those faced by prosecutors
throughout the nation. The defendant had been charged with man-
slaughter following a fatal crash. A drunkometer test revealed that
one hour and forty-five minutes after the accident the percentage
of alcohol in the defendant's blood was .189 per cent by weight.
The prosecution posed a hypothetical question which, in sub-
stance, asked the expert witness, Doctor R. N. Harger, whether he
could tell what the percentage of alcohol would have been at the
time of the accident. Defendant's objection on the ground that the
question called for a guess or broad conjecture on the part of the
witness was overruled. Doctor Harger then stated that the minimum
alcoholic concentration an hour and forty-five minutes preceding
testing would have been .165, although he explained that the per-
centage might have been higher because some persons are faster
"burners" than others. The Supreme Court of Indiana ruled that the
hypothetical question was proper in this instance and pointed out
that the weight to be given the expert's testimony was for the jury
to determine by considering his knowledge of the subject about
which he testified. 5
23. By taking two or more specimens from the individual during regularly spaced
intervals, the expert can determine the rate of elimination in the individual on the
particular occasion, and can further determine the blood-alcohol concentration in the
same individual at the time of the event in issue. DoNIGAN, CHEMucAL TESTS AM
T=E LAw 38 (1957); Newman, Proof of Alcoholic Intoxication, 34 Ky. L.J. 250
(1946).
24. Ray v. State, 233 Ind. 495, 120 N.E.2d 176 (1954).
25. Note that this would, in effect, be of great weight, for Doctor Harger developed
the drunkometer. See note 13 supra. In the following decisions, courts have approved
admissibility of expert opinion concerning concentration of alcohol at the time of the
incident, based upon results of delayed tests. People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d 252,
260 P.2d 8 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 931 (1954) (approximately 4 hours
delay); Nicholson v. City of Des Moines, 246 Iowa 318, 67 N.W.2d 533 (1954)
(approximately 8d4 hours delay); State v. Stairs, 143 Me. 245, 60 A.2d 141 (1948)
(approximately 4 hours delay). While alcohol concentration at the time of the event is
usually higher than that prevailing at the time a sample is received, the converse
may be true under extraordinary circumstances. If one should consume a considerable
quantity of alcohol and become involved in an accident before the absorption phase
is completed, a subsequent chemical test will likely show a blood-alcohol concentra-
tion higher than that existing at the time of accident. See Commonwealth v. Hartman,
383 Pa. 461, 119 A.2d 211 (1956). Attention is directed to the statutes of several
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Although chemical tests have proved to be of undoubted value as
an evidentiary aid, they should not be accepted as the sole criterion
for determining whether a given person was under the influence of
intoxicants. 8 Complete reliance upon scientific evidence may result
in the construction of a clinically infallible determination of intoxica-
tion, but chemical symbols and arithmetical computations, accurate
as they may be, seldom convince a skeptical and unsympathetic jury,
particularly in borderline cases. Moreover, other evidence is ordi-
narily easy to obtain. As a rule, police officers do not conduct hap-
hazard searches for motorists who are under the influence of alcohol.
Before a motorist attracts the attention of an officer, he must have
acted carelessly in some overt way, such as driving in a reckless
manner, passing another car on a hill or around a curve, or weaving
back and forth across the highway. And after being apprehended,
the motorist may exhibit other characteristics suggestive of overin-
dulgence in intoxicants. The officer normally checks the motorist's
appearance, behavior, and speech and then proceeds to inquire as to
when, where, and how much the person had been drinldng.27 Obvi-
ously, then, successful prosecution does not binge upon a test-tube
reaction but rather upon the sum total of the officer's observations as
substantiated by the results of the chemical test.28
II. POSSIBLE CONsrntunoNAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTONS
ON CimicAI TESTING
The great majority of courts will admit evidence of alcoholic tests
where, as is true in most cases, the person voluntarily submits to
states which limit admissibility of chemical-test evidence to those situations wherein
specimens were taken within two hours of the event or within two hours of the time
of arrest. For example, Minnesota provides that a court may admit evidence of
the percentage of alcohol in a person's blood, if the test was taken voluntarily within
two hours after commission of the offense. MumN. STAT. § 169.121 (1957). The
statutes of Delaware, New York, Virginia, and Wisconsin contain similar provisions.
For pertinent statutory citations, see note 2 supra.
26. Muehlberger, Medicolegal Aspects of Chemical Tests of Alcoholic Intoxica-
tion, 39 J. Cram. L., C. & P.S. 411 (1948).
27. The Alcoholic Influence Report Form, published by the National Safety
Council, suggests a thorough course of inquiry to be followed in interrogating persons
suspected of driving while under the influence of alcohol.
28. Some states have statutes which might prohibit convictions based solely upon
chemical test results. For example, in Wisconsin, the chemical-test statute specifically
requires corroborating physical evidence before evidence that a person has a blood-
alcohol concentration of 0.15% or more will be considered as prima facie evidence
that he was under the influence of intoxicants. Wis. STAT. § 325.235 (1955).
Schwartz v. Schneuriger, 269 Wis. 535, 69 N.W.2d 756 (1955) (strong odor of
intoxicants and eye witness testimony as to manner of driving vehicle considered
sufficient corroboration).
In addition, no statutory presumption in this area of legislation is conclusive, and
as long as presumptions remain rebuttable, orthodox methods of jury persuasion
remain intact. State v. Bailey, 184 Kan. 704, 339 P.2d 45 (1959).
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testing. However, an apprehended person's refusal to do so may raise
further legal problems concerning the use of chemical tests: (a)
whether involuntary submission constitutes a violation of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination; (b) whether the taking of a body
substance amounts to an unlawful search and seizure; (c) whether
the chemical test itself violates due process; and (d) if a physician
is involved, whether the time-worn, physician-patient privilege
applies.
To avoid these dilemmas, every law enforcement officer should
make special effort to obtain the consent of each arrestee. In addition
it would be prudent (whenever feasible) to obtain his signature ac-
knowledging that he voluntarily consented to the test and that it
was implemented without pressure, coercion, or duress. If the arrest-
ing officer carefully adheres to these simple precautions, the prosecu-
tion will be in a superior position should the defendant decide to
create an atmosphere of compulsion.
A. Self-Incrimination
(1) Scope of the Privilege
A series of decisions handed down through the past century has
determined that the Federal Bill of Rights, including the fifth
amendment protection against self-incrimination, binds only the
federal government.29 In Twining v. New Jersey,30 the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the fourteenth amendment does
not impose the self-incrimination restriction upon state action either
under the privileges and immunities clause or as a requirement of
fair trial under the due process clause of that amendment. And the
Court recently reaffirmed the due process part of this policy-making
decision in Adamson v. California.3 1 Nevertheless, a privilege against
self-incrimination does apply in every jurisdiction in the nation -
29. Feldman v. United States, 822 U.S. 487 (1944); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591 (1896).
80. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
31. 332 U.S. 46 (1947). In dissent, Mr. Justice Black, supported by Justices
Murphy, Rutledge and Douglas, was of the opinion that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment made all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights binding on
the states. This, he believed, was the intention of the framers of the amendment, as
indicated by the historical evidence. In a vigorous, well-documented attack on the
Courts time-honored, natural-law method of interpreting the fourteenth amend-
ment, he contended that it was the intent of Congress, when passing that amend-
ment, to guarantee the privileges of the Bill of Rights against abridgment by state
action. Id. at 68-92. He also stated that the Court should give effect to that intent
and cease to "'roam at will in the limitless area of their own beliefs as to reasonable-
ness."' Id. at 92, quoting from FTC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 599,
601 n.4 (1942). His proposals, though well-phrased, were not new and have been
specifically rejected in a long line of cases. See Notes, 33 IowA L. REV. 666 (1948);
46 MacH. L. BEr. 372 (1948); 58 YALE L.J. 268 (1949).
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in forty-eight states by constitution, and in the remaining two by
statute. As the constitutions and statutes of the several states vary in
terminology, so do the decisions interpreting the scope of privileges
provided for.
Traditional view. Historically, the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion has had little, if any, pertinency to the taking of body sub-
stances. As expressed in federal and state constitutions, the privilege
provides a safeguard against being compelled to be a witness, being
compelled to give oral testimony in court, and being compelled to
produce in court (or in any formal governmental hearing) under
judicial order, documents and other objects the forced disclosure of
which would amount to testimonial compulsion. In Dean Wigmore's
words: "It is the employment of legal process to extract from the
person's own lips an admission of his guilt. " 2 The prohibition against
compelling a man to be a witness against himself is a condemnation
of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extract communica-
tions from him, and does not apply to the admissibility in evidence
of his body substances.3
Broader view. Most of the recent cases support the earlier deci-
sions which applied the privilege only to testimonial compulsion.34
However, the arena is not free from dissent. The Texas decisions are
typical of the minority which clings to a broader interpretation of
the privilege. In Apodaca v. State,35 the accused had killed a pedes-
trian, and upon his arrest was required to furnish a urine specimen
and perform a routine of muscular movements -the usual sudden
turns, walking the line, and the finger-on-nose exhibition. In the
opinion of the examiners, both sets of tests indicated alcoholic in-
toxication, but the appellate court ruled that compelling such action
violated the privilege against self-incrimination.
Fifteen years later, in Trammell v. State,"8 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals adhered to the same strict principle announced in
Apodaca, which required express consent of the accused before sub-
mission to a clinical-symptom test or a chemical test of the breath
32. 8 WIemOR.E, EviDENcE § 2263 (8d ed. 1940). See Note, Scientifi Tests for
Intoxication -a Constitutional Limitation, 39 VA. L. REv. 215 (1953).
33. State v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909 (1950); State v. Gatton, 60
Ohio App. 192, 20 N.E.2d 265 (1938); IwNAu, SELF INCRMNATION 72 (1950);
McCoRMicx, EviENcE § 126 (1954).
34. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal. 2d
105, 194 P.2d 681 (1948); Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 240 P.2d 512 (1951), cert.
denied, 843 U.S. 978 (1952); Alldredge v. State, 156 N.E.2d 888 (Ind. 1959); State
v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909 (1950); State v. Gatton, 60 Ohio App. 192,
20 N.E.2d 265 (1938); State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P.2d 283 (1945); Com-
monwealth v. Safis, 122 Pa. Super. 333, 186 At. 177 (1936); State v. Pierce, 120
Vt. 373, 141 A.2d 419 (1958). See 24 Munr. L. REv. 444 (1940).
35. 140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1941).
36. 162 Tex. Crim. 543, 287 S.W.2d 487 (1956); Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1407 (1952).
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or body fluids. In the Trammell case, the accused was injured in a
traffic collision and was promptly transported to a hospital, where a
specimen of blood was extracted from his arm. At the trial a toxicolo-
gist testified that the blood sample had been analyzed under his su-
pervision. Over objection by the defense, the witness stated that the
alcoholic concentration in the sample was 0.828 per cent. He fur-
ther testified that no authority would disagree that such alcoholic
concentration indicated definite intoxication. On appeal, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals applied the self-incrimination privilege to
this type of compelled conduct, thereby reversing the trial court's ad-
mission of this testimony, and proceeded to consider whether de-
fendant had waived the privilege. There was no testimony showing
that the accused had consented to the taking of the blood sample,
but neither was there testimony that he did not assent or agree. The
appellate court held that the state failed to prove that the specimen
was taken with the consent of the accused, and thus the accused
had not waived his privilege against self-incrimination. Conse-
quently, the testimony of the toxicologist was inadmissible.
Contrary, then, to the traditional concept of the scope of the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination is this second view which extends the
protection of the privilege to compelled conduct other than giving
oral testimony and producing in court documents and other objects.
Under this view, passive submission may be compelled but not active
cooperation.3 7 Thus, although the accused might be required to sub-
mit to finger-printing or to the extraction of blood and other body
substances, he could not be compelled to provide a sample of his
handwriting or aid in re-enacting the crime. Conceivably, under this
point of view, the accused might be required to rise in court for
purposes of identification and inspection of his features; yet he could
not be compelled to do any act or expose any part of his body the
result of which might be used as the basis for an inference against
him. s Unfortunately, the fine line distinguishing enforced activity
and enforced passivity does not lend itself to easy and immediate
discernment, and it seems inevitable that the drawing of subtle dis-
tinctions will lead to indistinguishable conflicts among judicial
opinions. 9
Black-Douglas view. The privilege against self-incrimination has
been expressed in a most novel yet humanitarian light by Justices
Black and Douglas in recent concurring and dissenting opinions.
37. For a complete discussion of pertinent authorities, see McCoRMncI., Evi-
DENcE § 126 (1954); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self Incrimination, 34 MINN.
L. REv. 1, 88 (1949).
38. See, e.g., Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1941).
39. Numerous cases pointing up the conflicting views and their application in
varied fact situations are collected in Annot., 171 A.L.R. 1144 (1947).
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They would extend the protection of the privilege even to passive
submission. Neither Justice would draw a constitutional distinction
between involuntary extraction of words, involuntary extraction of
the contents of the stomach, and involuntary extraction of body
fluids, when the evidence obtained is used to convict.40 Mr. Justice
Black has said: "[A] person is compelled to be a witness against him-
self when ...incriminating evidence is forcibly taken from him by
a contrivance of modem science." 4 ' Mr. Justice Douglas agreed and
stated that "words taken from his lips, capsules taken from his
stomach, blood taken from his veins are all inadmissible provided
they are taken from him without his consent . .. [-] inadmissible
because of the command of the Fifth Amendment." 42 Both Justices
assert that a standard of due process for trial by the federal govern-
ment should likewise be observed by state authorities and continually
insist that inhibitions on governmental action inherent in the fifth
amendment should be imposed upon the states through the four-
teenth amendment. 3
Dissenting in Breithaupt v. Abram,44 they asserted, without equi-
vocation, that under our system of government, police cannot com-
pel people to furnish the evidence necessary to send them to prison.
Interpreted out of context, a statement of this type seems to imply
that a citizen may react as an extreme individualist at all times, un-
daunted by duties to cooperate for the preservation of a decent social
order. The high level of social and moral values inherent in the
structure of a democratic society undoubtedly endows citizens with
a generous number of rights and privileges that are routinely denied
in a totalitarian community. However, this factor does not automati-
cally create an inference that the democratic state is powerless to
perpetuate its sense of order in the face of an obstinate citizenry.
Mr. Justice Douglas has noted that judges and lawyers often forget
that the Anglo-American system of criminal law is designed to
reduce police control and increase judicial control.45 The Black-
Douglas dissents constantly remind us of this very important princi-
ple, and one cannot deny the import of their pleas for a rational
consideration of individual rights. However, sometimes compara-
tively unimportant individual interests are unnecessarily overempha-
sized at the expense of legitimate governmental interests. Granted,
there is an urgent need to provide protection against torture, both
physical and mental; yet it appears far-fetched to insist that Justice
40. See the dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Douglas in Breithaupt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 442 (1957).
41. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring).
43. See note 31 supra.
44. 352 U.S. 432, 442 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
45. Douglas, The Means and the End, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 103, 110.
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will perish simply because the accused is subject to a duty to respond
to orderly governmental inquiry." Actually, Mr. Justice Douglas has
conceded that "an accused can be compelled to be present at trial,
to stand, to sit, to turn this way and that, and to try on a cap or a
coat."47 Even he therefore sanctions a very low degree of govern-
mental compulsion of an individual. All legal writers and jurists
agree that somewhere along the continuum compulsion becomes ob-
noxious; in Douglas' view this occurs at a point short of outright
physical coercion. The exact point at which this line must constitu-
tionally be drawn has never been clearly defined nor agreed upon
and very likely never will be.
(2) "Consent" by Unconscious Persons
In many accident cases, the person is actually unconscious at the
time the test is given or the sample drawn and is therefore in no po-
sition to voice disapproval. Regardless of this obvious deprivation of
privacy, most authorities have held that evidence so obtained is ad-
missible.4 Moreover, the fact that a person has sufficient alcohol in
his blood to make him an unsafe driver does not automatically ren-
der him incapable of "consenting" to a chemical test.49 The general
rule is that if the accused is mentally capable of perceiving or com-
prehending events and his surroundings, he is legally capable of
consent. Yet it is conceivable that extreme intoxication will point to
lack of real consent and necessitate rejection of chemical-test evi-
dence in those jurisdictions where express consent is a condition
precedent to the admissibility of test results.5° However, a majority
of jurisdictions have admitted chemical-test evidence without proof
of actual consent, barring objection on constitutional grounds.51
46. See the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
47. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 179 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring).
48. People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d 252, 260 P.2d 8 (1953), cert. denie, 347
U.S. 931 (1954). While Mrs. Haeussler was unconscious, a hospital attendant
withdrew five cubic centimeters of blood from her arm. Test results were admitted
in evidence, the Supreme Court of California holding that this procedure did not
violate either the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to due process.
See also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36,
240 P.2d 512 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 978 (1952); State v. Sturtevant, 96
N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909 (1950).
49. Bowden v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 382, 246 P.2d 427 (1952); Jones v. State,
159 Tex. Crim. 29, 261 S.W.2d 161 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 830 (1953).
50. In two states the case law requires express consent. State v. Wardlaw, 107
So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1958); McCreary v. State, 307 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957).
Chemical-test legislation in Colorado, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, and
Virginia requires the person's express consent. See relevant statutes cited note 2
supra. In Minnesota, admissibility of test results is dependent upon a voluntary
submission. MnqN. STAT. § 169.121 (1957).
51. Where the subject is unconscious at the time the sample is drawn, in actuality
he neither consents nor refuses. Without express statutory prohibition or objection
raised on constitutional grounds, evidence of test results is generally admissible in
such cases.
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Even in jurisdictions where consent is required, it is generally held
that written consent is not necessary;5 nor is it necessary to warn
the accused, before he submits to a chemical test, that the results
might be used against him in a future criminal proceeding.5 3
B. Unlawful Search and Seizure
The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and sei-
zures,5" but it does not necessarily preclude the use in a criminal
trial of evidence obtained by such a search . 5 Although the Supreme
Court has held that such illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible
in the federal courts, the exclusionary rule does not extend to the
states?3 Whether a search of private property or personal effects is
reasonable obviously must be determined by the facts and circum-
stances of the individual case.T Normally, a search warrant must be
obtained, but when the search is incident to a lawful arrest, fail-
ure to obtain a warrant does not necessarily make the search
unreasonable."'
The problem is whether the several constitutional prohibitions
against unreasonable searches and seizures should apply, under cer-
tain conditions, to the taking of breath and other body substances
for chemical-testing purposes. The Supreme Court of the United
States has not yet ruled on the reasonableness of an internal search
of the body or its substances; nor has it adopted a fourth amendment
52. Written consent is required in Oregon by statute. ORE. REv. STAT. § 483.630
(1955). In Texas, a confession statute requires that a confession obtained from an
accused under arrest be in writing. However, the Texas courts have not extended
this statutory requirement to the obtaining of specimens for chemical testing, and
oral consent is sufficient. Tealer v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 629, 296 S.W.2d 260
(1956); Brown v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 144, 240 S.W.2d 310 (1951).
53. State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P.2d 435 (1937); People v. Hardin, 138
Cal. App. 2d 169, 291 P.2d 193 (1955).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
55. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). It should be observed that in Wolf
although the Court held that the illegally-obtained evidence need not be excluded, it
also held that provisions of the fourth amendment were enforceable against unreason-
able state action through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Conceivably, the opinion stands for the proposition that obtaining evidence by a
search which would have violated the fourth amendment if made by federal officers
necessarily violates the fourteenth amendment when made by state officers. The
by-products of Wolf are thoroughly analyzed in Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years
Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 Mnv. L. RBv. 1083
(1959).
56. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 883 (1914). See FED. R. Cum. P. 26.
57. "The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant,
but whether the search was reasonable. That criterion in turn depends upon the
facts and circumstances -the total atmosphere of the case." Rabinowitz v. United
States, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950), overruling Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699
(1948).
58. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (dictum); MACHEN, LAw OF
SEA cH AND SEIZURE 66 (1950); cf. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451
(1948); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
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standard for such searches.59 And although lower federal courts and
state courts have passed upon the problem on numerous occasions,
one fact remains clear- their opinions are not always in accord and
their analogies are frequently strained.
(1) The Blackford Decision
Although not directly related to the chemical-testing problem, the
recent Ninth Circuit decision in Blackford v. United States,60 inched
close to a solution of the general problem of internal bodily search.
Blackford was stopped by customs officers at the international boun-
dary line in California. 61 He was asked to remove his coat, where-
upon numerous puncture marks were revealed in the veins of his
arms. Further examination of his person disclosed that the defend-
ant may have concealed a quantity of heroin in a body cavity. There-
after he was taken to a hospital where, despite his denial of conceal-
ment and his resistance to search, qualified medical personnel
removed the heroin. In a subsequent prosecution for illegal importa-
tion and concealment of heroin, the defendant's motion to suppress
the evidence thus obtained was denied. The court of appeals af-
firmed the denial, holding that the search and seizure did not violate
either the fourth or fifth amendment. In arriving at its decision, the
court noted, however, that the fourteenth amendment provided a
bulwark against unreasonable searches and seizures of persons as
well as places. The court applied the test of reasonableness to the
conduct of the officers, noting that this was a stricter test than that
applied to state proceedings under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
6 2
The fourteenth amendment draws no precise distinction between
searches of property and searches of the person, but accepted values
concerning the dignity of the human body compel a conclusion
that some reasonable limit should be placed upon internal bodily
searches. Some extremists, dedicated to the idea that the human body
is inviolate, assert that almost all internal searches are unreason-
able.63 However, this thesis seems undesirable in that a total pro-
59. For a comprehensive treatment of the historical implications of the fourth
amendment, see Fraenkel, Search and Seizure Developments in Federal Law Since
1948, 41 IowA L. REv. 67 (1956); Trimble, Search and Seizure Under the Fourth
Amendment as Interpreted by the United States Supreme Court (pts. 1-4), 41 Ky.
L.J. 196, 388, 42 Ky. L.J. 197, 423 (1952-1954).
60. 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958). See Note,
106 U. PA. L. REv. 1165 (1958).
61. Search of persons, vehicles and vessels by customs inspectors is authorized by
Rev. Stat. § 3061 (1875), 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1958); 49 Stat. 521 (1935), 19 U.S.C.
§ 1581 (1958); 46 Stat. 748 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1958).
62. Due process requirements are discussed at text accompanying notes 77-89
infra.
63. This seems to represent the viewpoint of Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Jus-
tices Black and Douglas who dissented in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 440
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hibition of internal bodily searches would unnecessarily place valu-
able evidence beyond the reach of law enforcement officers. The
Blackford decision indicated that there is nothing in the Bill of
Rights which makes a body cavity a legally-protected sanctuary for
carrying narcotics. Thus the court concluded that removal of foreign
matter from body cavities does not per se violate the Constitution
any more than compelling a person holding narcotics in his clenched
fist to open his hand. Granted, the court decided only the precise
issue before it and did not offer carte blanche authority to subject
a human being to any type of physical examination, but the court
did state that it considered pain and danger to be minimal factors in
that situation, particularly since much of the pain resulted from the
defendant's own resistance.
Although stating that the test of reasonableness was more strin-
gent than that required by the fourteenth amendment, the court
nonetheless relied on Rochin v. California4 and Breithaupt v.
Abram,65 fourteenth amendment cases, as furnishing the most prac-
tical guides. The court referred to several material factual differences
which led it to conclude that Rochin was not dispositive of Black-
ford. Rochin was subjected to a series of abuses and violations of his
rights, commencing with an unlawful entry into his home, continu-
ing with the forcible attempt by officers to prevent him from
swallowing capsules, and culminating in a brutal episode of stomach
pumping. On the other hand, the police officers made no attempt to
force evacuation of the heroin from Blackford's rectum, and the
actual physical examination was conducted by qualified medical
personnel, under sanitary conditions, and with the use of medically-
approved procedures. Moreover, the procedure employed was a rel-
atively simple one, involving little danger of lasting illness or disabil-
ity. Pain did result when Blackford refused to cooperate; however,
the court was correct in discounting the pain element in this in-
stance, for to hold otherwise would place a premium on violent and
stubborn resistance.
(1957). Cf. United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1957). In the
Townsend case, defendant was charged with carnal knowledge of a girl under
sixteen, and there was evidence that the complaining witness was menstruating at the
time of the alleged offense. Informed that chemical tests would be run on his penis
to determine the presence of blood, defendant offered physical resistance, but a police
detective overcame this resistance by twisting the defendant's arms behind his back.
Meanwhile a sergeant pulled down the defendant's trousers and swabbed his penis
with patches of chemically treated cotton. In a well-documented opinion Judge
Youngdahl concluded that the defendant was deprived of due process of law under
the fifth amendment. Aside from the fact that evidence obtained in this case was
of doubtful probative value, it must be noted that the defendant was taken to police
headquarters in the middle of the night and denied the right to contact an attorney.
64. 42 U.S. 165 (1952). More extensive comment regarding due process aspects
of the Rochin decision follows at text accompanying notes 77-89 infra.
65. Cited note 63 supra.
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Furthermore, the officers in Rochin had only a suspicion that the
defendant had swallowed narcotic pills, but the officers in Black-
ford had almost incontrovertible proof that their subject possessed
hidden narcotics. They knew that Blackford was an addict on parole
from a state drug conviction, and they knew specifically what Black-
ford had concealed, where it was, and how much was there. In fact,
Blackford himself had admitted his illegal possession of the narcot-
ics. The court also took judicial notice of the fact that in the preced-
ing two and one-half years, twenty per cent of the smuggling cases
in the San Diego area had involved narcotics concealed in body cavi-
ties. This served to point up the gravity of the social problem
presented by narcotics violations, and there was no doubting that
the court of appeals was aware that narcotics laws have been tradi-
tionally difficult to enforce.66
Although the Blaclcord case may present a common sense solution
of the search and seizure problem relating to the seizure of foreign
substances from body cavities, it leaves unanswered the question
whether constitutional prohibitions should be extended to the force-
ful obtaining of body substances. Analogies may clarify some of the
patent ambiguities, but analogies fail to be convincing unless trans-
lated into practical terms. Dean Ladd and Professor Gibson have
insisted that the constitutional "provision against unlawful searches
and seizures was designed to serve as a security to persons in their
possessions and effects, to protect the individual from an invasion
of his home without proper warrant . . . and to protect the individ-
ual from being searched personally for his possessions without rea-
son, or suspicion." 67 In essence, this type of protection deals with
things which a person might possess and with the privacy of his
home rather than with his personal make-up or physical condition.
Thus, they would advocate that a test of body substances or a physi-
cal examination would not come within the range of the constitu-
66. Some lower federal court cases subsequent to Black ord have followed Black-
ford and some have not. In King v. United States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1958),
the Fifth Circuit cited Blackfford in upholding a similar search, noting the sterility
which would follow efforts at law enforcement if searches of this type were to be
prohibited. Similarly, a federal district court has held that where a defendant, in
crossing from Mexico to the United States under the influence of narcotics, was
properly seized and arrested, and the arresting officers had reason to believe that
he was concealing narcotics, extraction of a drug container from the defendant's
rectum by a physician under police direction did not "shock the conscience," within
the meaning of the phrase as used by the Supreme Court in Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). Application of Woods, 154 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Cal. 1957),
appeal denied, 249 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1957). Accord, United States v. Michel, 158
F. Supp. 84 (S.D. Tex. 1957). Two other district courts, however, have held that the
use of a stomach pump and an emetic to recover swallowed narcotics is unreason-
able. United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949); In re Cuzzardi,
84 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Tex. 1949).
67. Ladd & Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine
Intoxication, 24 IowA L. REV. 191, 216 (1939).
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tional restraint upon unlawful search and seizure. Historical purpose
supports this contention of Ladd and Gibson, for the fourth amend-
ment originally was designed to curb the nefarious practice of arbi-
trary government invasion of private homes. It is difficult to believe
that the framers of the Constitution could have envisaged the uses
to which biochemistry might be put in a twentieth-century world,
and there is strong reason to doubt that they would have included
a search for body substances as such within the ambit of their pro-
hibitory sanctions. If case law recognized and enforced this proposi-
tion, the search and seizure problem would not beg solution, but
precedents relating to searches and seizures of body substances are
few in number and rarely reveal unity of sentiment. For pertinent
chemical-test cases, we must consult state-court decisions.
(2) Admissibility of Chemical-Test Results in State Courts
Several years ago, the Supreme Court of Arizona ruled that force-
fully obtaining a breath specimen for chemical-testing purposes did
not violate the search and seizure provision of the Arizona Constitu-
tion. 8 Following arrest for driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, the defendant refused to submit to a drunk-
ometer test. However, despite his strenuous objections, police offi-
cers strapped him to a chair, and while one held the defendant's
head steady, another captured his breath by means of a rubber
suction bulb and tube. Holding that this police action did not con-
stitute an unlawful search and seizure, the appellate court observed
that the defendant was not forced to exhale breath from his lungs,
inasmuch as he exhaled voluntarily and, in fact, of necessity to
survive. The moment his breath passed his lips, it was no longer
his to control but became a part of the surrounding atmosphere.
Thus the officers had the lawful right to capture his breath for use
as evidence. Under the circumstances, this was a novel holding but
not convincing as a precedent particularly with reference to the
factor of volition.
In People v. Duroncelay,69 the Supreme Court of California ruled
that the taking of a blood sample did not constitute an unlawful
search and seizure. There was no evidence that the defendant had
consented to the taking of the test; nor, on the other hand, was there
evidence that he verbally protested against its being performed.
There was evidence, however, that he drew his arm away when the
nurse first attempted to insert the needle and that an ambulance
driver then held his arm while the nurse extracted the blood. Affirm-
ing the trial court's ruling admitting the chemical-test results, the
supreme court found that there was a lawful arrest in this instance
68. State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953).
69. 48 Cal. 2d 766, 312 P.2d 690 (1957).
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and stated that the search was not unlawful merely because it pre-
ceded, rather than followed, the arrest. A search may constitution-
ally be made either before or after arrest if reasonable grounds for
making an arrest exist at the time of the search. It was not apparent
exactly when the arrest had been made, but since the defendant
was unconscious for a greater part of a forty-eight hour period, it
would be assumed that the arrest took place after that time.
Some courts, however, have been more lenient with the defend-
ants. Despite the fact that Iowa does not adhere to the rule exclud-
ing evidence obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure,
the Supreme Court of Iowa has held evidence of a blood test
inadmissible when blood was obtained from the body of an uncon-
scious motorist, no arrest having been made or information filed. 0
The defendant, painfully injured in an automobile collision, was
transported to a nearby hospital for treatment. While he was on the
operating table, a coroner from another county proceeded to draw
blood from his arm, without requesting the consent of the defend-
ant's wife, who was waiting in a hospital corridor. Here, then, was
a situation where a volunteer, without legal warrant and without ex-
press or implied assent, drew blood from an unconscious person to
insure the success of possible future prosecution. In rejecting expert
testimony relative to the chemical-test results, the majority did not
rely on unreasonable search and seizure or lack of due process but
was content to rest the decision upon its abhorrence of the coroner's
insensate behavior. Although the case may have been correctly
decided on its precise facts, it is a doubtful precedent for future
action.71
A recent Wisconsin case, State v. Kroening,72 rejected chemical-
test evidence on grounds of unreasonable search and seizure. Fol-
lowing an automobile accident, the defendant was admitted to a
hospital where a blood test was performed by a registered nurse
with the consent of the attending physician, at the request and
upon the direction of the district attorney. The blood sample was
drawn while the defendant was unconscious or at the most semi-
conscious- hence taken without his consent. He was not arrested
on any charge until after the coroner's inquest nine days later. The
70. State v. Weltha, 228 Iowa 519, 292 N.W. 148 (1940).
71. Previous Iowa decisions reflected anything but unanimity of opinion. In State
v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902), the court held that a physical exam-
ination of the accused to determine presence of veneral infection was an unlawful
search and seizure. A later decision, State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 191 N.W. 530
(1928), held that evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure was admissible,
despite federal decisions to the contrary. See Ladd & Gibson, supra note 67 at
215. In State v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909 (1950), the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire noted that the view entertained in the Weltha case did not prevail
in that state.
72. 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956). Note, 41 MAEQ. L. REv. 93 (1957).
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government contended that the taking of the blood sample was not
a search and seizure in the constitutional sense but merely part
of a physical examination; however, the court disagreed, holding
that a search and seizure and a physical examination are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive.73 The court recognized that a search and
seizure incidental to a lawful arrest would not violate constitutional
rights of the person searched, but it found that the lapse of time in
this case between search and arrest was far too long to support a
conclusion that this search was an incident to the arrest. The court
further observed that admitting evidence in violation of the defend-
ant's rights under the state constitution constituted a denial of due
process under Wisconsin law, and that violation by the state of its
own constitution would inevitably deny the defendant due process
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. 4
It is apparent that the foregoing decisions had stressed two basic
factors in determining whether a search and seizure would be un-
lawful under the circumstances: (1) time of search in relation to
arrest; and (2) presence or absence of unreasonable, abusive physi-
cal force. If little or no force is employed and the search is conducted
by qualified personnel at or near the time of arrest, it is likely thatjudicial disfavor and rebuff will be kept at a minimum. On the
other hand, if the search and seizure are made without due regard
to time of arrest and elements of force are obvious, one might expect
to cope with strong judicial resentment. Between these extremes of
conduct, however, lies a twilight zone where predictions might well
go awry.
73. "We do not understand that the constitutional provision in question forbids
officers to go through one's pockets but permits them to go through his veins." 274
Wis. at 273, 79 N.W.2d at 815.
74. The recent holding of the Supreme Court of Michigan in Lebel v. Swincicki,
854 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958), deserves consideration. Defendant was re-
moved to a hospital immediately after a motor-vehicle collision in which several per-
sons were fatally injured. At the direction of a physician, blood was drawn from the
defendant while he was unconscious and not under arrest at that time. Chemical-
test evidence was admitted in the trial court, but the Supreme Court of Michigan held
the evidence inadmissible as a violation of the provision of the Michigan Constitu-
tion prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure. The majority opinion stressed the
fact that the blood sample was taken in violation of the defendant's right of security
to his person and saw no distinction in principle between obtaining a blood sample
from an unconscious person and taking such from a conscious person by force. M4ore-
over, the court concluded that the majority opinion in Breithaupt v. Abram, 852 U.S.
432 (1957), had held that evidence against Breithaupt had been obtained in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment, and further observed that provisions of the Michigan
Constitution were identical in substance with those of the fourth amendment. If the
Michigan court's assumptions are correct, one would not be in a position to deny the
validity of its final decision, but it is submitted that the majority opinion in Breithaupt
did not hold that the evidence in that case was obtained in violation of rights pro-
tected by the fourth amendment; only by strained implication can one reach such a
conclusion.
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C. Due Process
A third constitutional problem is whether the chemical-test pro-
cedure violates due process.75 A leading analogous Supreme Court
decision is People v. Rochin.70 California police suspected Rochin
of selling narcotics. They unlawfully broke into his room and were
about to seize two capsules lying on a night-stand when Rochin
thrust the capsules in his mouth. Rochin was then taken to a nearby
hospital and strapped to a table while a physician forced a tube
and emetic solution down his throat, causing him to disgorge the
contents of his stomach. Rochin was later tried and convicted on a
charge of illegally possessing morphine, and the capsules were ad-
mitted as evidence over his objection. A district court of appeal
affirmed the conviction,7 7 and the Supreme Court of California re-
fused to grant a re-hearing.78 However, on certiorari the Supreme
Court of the United States reversed the conviction on grounds of
violation of due process. 9 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the
majority,80 reasoned that the conviction rested on evidence which
was inadmissible because it was obtained by methods "too close to
the rack and the screw. .. " 81 Relying upon the "coerced confes-
sion" cases, the majority drew no distinction between forced extrac-
tions from the mind and forced extractions from the body.
After the Rochin decision, the due process argument was un-
successfully invoked in numerous criminal cases involving the
admissibility of chemical-test evidence. In State v. Berg,82 the
Supreme Court of Arizona, taking cognizance of Rochin, ruled that
there was no violation of due process when a defendant motorist
was compelled to submit to a drunkometer test. Likewise, the Su-
preme Court of California held that drawing blood from the arm of
an unconscious person did not violate standards of due process.83
75. A tangential problem to that of the constitutionality of chemical testing to
determine whether a person is under the influence of alcohol is whether due process
requires a jury trial in a prosecution in municipal court for driving while under the
influence of alcohol. The Supreme Court of Minnesota recently reversed a municipal
court's denial of a jury trial in such a case. State v. Hoben, 98 N.W. 2d 813 (Minn.
1959). For a detailed analysis of the reasoning in the Hoben case and an evaluation
of its result, see 44 MINN. L. REyv.- (1960).
76. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
77. People v. Rochin, 101 Cal. App. 2d 140, 225 P.2d 1 (1950).
78. People v. Rochin, 101 Cal. App. 2d 143, 225 P.2d 913 (1951).
79. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See Notes, 50 MicH. L. TEy. 1367
(1952); 4 STAN. L. BEv. 591 (1952).
80. justices Black and Douglas concurred in the result but on different grounds.
They considered the admission of the evidence a violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination. To reverse for this reason would require that Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), be overruled.
81. 842 U.S. at 172.
82. See note 68 supra.
83. People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d 252, 260 P.2d 8 (1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 931 (1954).
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And a year later a California district court of appeal held that,
despite the use of violence to compel the defendant to take an intox-
imeter test, results of the test were admissible in a subsequent prose-
cution for driving an automobile while under the influence of
intoxicants. 84
Five years after Rochin, due process and chemical testing came
to focus in the celebrated case of Breithaupt v. Abram.5 Petitioner
Breithaupt was seriously injured in an automobile accident in which
three other persons were killed. He was taken to a hospital, and
while he lay unconscious in the emergency room, the smell of liquor
was detected on his breath. At the request of a state patrolman, a
physician extracted a blood specimen to determine whether the peti-
tioner was intoxicated, and evidence concerning alcoholic content
of the specimen was subsequently admitted at the trial where he
was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. No appeal was taken
and a subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied
by the Supreme Court of New Mexico.86 In a 6-8 decision, the Su-
preme Court of the United States affirmed the denial of the writ. 7
In substance, the Court held that the petitioner's conviction did not
deny him the due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.
Breithaupt attempted unsuccessfully to invoke the bar of Rochin,
but the majority distinguished the case on the fact that there was
nothing brutal or offensive in the taking of a blood sample when
done under the protective eye of a physician. However, the Court
did suggest that the indiscriminate taking of blood under different
conditions or by persons not qualified to do so might be the kind of
brutality proscribed by Rochin. The majority noted that blood tests
have become routine and that most states either expressly authorize
such tests or at least admit their results in evidence. Thus the Court
reasoned that the right of inviolability of the person against such a
slight intrusion was outweighed by the interest of society in scien-
tific determination of intoxication and the tendency of such tests to
deter persons from driving while under the influence of alcohol.
In dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas observed that, as he understood
the court's decision, there would be a violation of due process if
blood had been withdrawn from the accused after a struggle with
84. People v. Kiss, 125 Cal. App. 2d 138, 269 P.2d 924 (1954). The court indi-
cated that test results would be excluded only where the accused was so terrorized
into submission that to admit evidence as such would be a mockery and a pretense of
a trial.
85. 352 U.S. 432 (1957), 71 HAnv. L. Rzv. 161 (1957), 42 MnrqN. L. REv. 662
(1958), 35 TExAs L. REv. 813 (1957), 11 V.ND. L. REv. 196 (1957).
86. Breithaupt v. Abram, 58 N.M. 385, 271 P.2d 827 (1954).
87. Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas dissented. Mr. Jus-
tice Clark wrote the majority opinion.
[Vol. 44:673
1960] CHEMICAL TESTING FOR INTOXICATION
the police. "Under our system of government," he said, "police can-
not compel people to furnish evidence necessary to send them to
prison."8 The weakness in his position is that it almost assumes that
responsibility is one-sided and that the individual has only minimal
obligations of citizenship. If no force whatsoever were counte-
nanced, the law-abiding citizen would, in effect, be penalized un-
fairly; the obstreperous, vocative citizen would succeed in his mission
to thwart the law at every turn. Furthermore, a prohibition of
all reasonable attempts by society to compel production of evidence
is not only unwarranted but is symptomatic of a state of mind that
breeds disrespect for authority and order. One who forcefully op-
poses the law and its mission should expect a reasonable amount of
force in return.89
D. Physician-Patient Privilege
The common law recognized no privilege for confidential informa-
tion imparted by a patient to a physician. However, in 1828 New
York departed from this rule when its legislature provided for a
physician-patient privilege, and since that date a majority of Ameri-
can jurisdictions have enacted similar statutes. Though the statutory
provisions are not completely uniform, generally these enactments
provide that a licensed physician shall not, without the consent of
his patient, divulge any information or any opinion with respect to
knowledge acquired in attending the patient in a professional ca-
pacity.9 1
The problem to be examined here is: If a physician draws a blood
sample or any body fluid from the body of an inebriate, should the
physician-patient privilege preclude the physician from testifying?
Certainly, where there is no showing that the running of a chemical
88. 352 U.S. at 443.
89. Forceful investigatory procedures were approved as reasonable in the following
decisions: Blakfdord v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957); United States
v. Michel, 158 F. Supp. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1957); Application of Woods, 154 F. Supp.
932 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
90. Statutes are compiled and quoted in 8 WwmoRE, EvIDEN E § 2380 n.5 (3d
ed. 1940). The American Law Institute Code of Evidence was originally drafted
without reference to any privilege for medical secrets in court; however, last-minute
pressure exerted by attorneys from jurisdictions which have enacted the privilege,
caused the draftsmen of the Code to insert three sections establishing the physician-
patient privilege. Similarly, at the 1950 meeting of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, it was voted that the privilege should not be
recognized. Nevertheless, at the 1953 meetings, the Conference reversed its previous
action and by a close vote decided to include the privilege. See MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE, Rules 220-23 (1942); UNwoam RuLEs oF EVIDENCE, Rule 27 (1953).
See generally McComauscx, EvmENcE § 101 (1954); Chafee, Privileged Communica-
tions: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness
Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943).
91. For example, Minnesota legislation, in substance, so provides. MEm-r. STAT. §
595.02(4) (1957).
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test is at all necessary to enable the physician to treat or to diagnose
the person, the privilege should not apply. 2 In most cases, the
record will show affirmatively that the test was performed by the
physician on the request of a public officer, and medical services
so donated are rarely if ever rendered in an atmosphere of personal
confidence between the physician and examined person. The privi-
lege seeks its roots in a confidential relationship, and the bond be-
tween doctor and inebriate can scarcely be labeled confidential.
A closer question may arise when the physician who is called to
act in a professional capacity discovers that the subject whom he is
to attend needs emergency treatment. Even assuming that he gives
such emergency treatment, however, it seems that this factor alone
should not be held to create a confidential relationship which bars
use of the test results, for the chemical-testing situation is a matter
entirely disconnected from the treatment of the patient.93
Contrary to the trend of judicial sentiment, the Supreme Court of
Indiana has lately expanded the scope of the privilege, despite the
fact that the court indicated that the statute in question should be
strictly construed."4 While the defendant was lying unconscious in
a hospital, a physician, who at the time was "on call," took a blood
sample to determine the blood type preparatory to giving a trans-
fusion. A police officer who was present at the time requested the
physician to preserve a sample of the blood for the purpose of
making a chemical test. The physician complied with the officer's
request. Holding that the physician should not be permitted to
testify concerning the blood sample, the court ruled that this was
clearly information obtained by the physician "in the sick room."
The court placed considerable reliance upon a previous Indiana
decision which had prohibited the testimony of an emergency-ward
physician with respect to the "intoxicated condition" of a patient
admitted for treatment.9 Thus, if a physician could not testify from
observation whether or not in his opinion a patient was intoxicated,
he should not be qualified to testify concerning a blood sample
drawn without the patients consent. From this vantage point, it
appears that the Indiana court's very logical argument is based upon
an inaccurate and flimsy premise.9 6
92. Hanlon v. Woodhouse, 113 Colo. 504, 160 P.2d 998 (1945); Lebel v. Swin-
cicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958). "It is manifestly clear from the reasons
upon which the privilege is based and from the decided cases that where no treat-
ment is made or contemplated, there exists no relationship between the doctor and
patient that will support the privilege." Ladd & Gibson, supra note 67, at 254.
93. Richter v. Hoglund, 132 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1943); People v. Barnes, 197
Misc. 477, 98 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Schwartz v. Schneuriger, 269 Wis. 535,
69 N.W.2d 756 (1955).
94. Alder v. State, 154 N.E.2d 716 (Ind. 1958).
95. Chicago, S.B. & L.S. By. v. Walas, 192 Ind. 369, 135 N.E. 150 (1922).
96. A decision by the Supreme Court of Kansas has reached a common-sense re-
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III. IMP=IED CONSENT STATUTES
Disturbed by the growing menace of the intoxicated driver, many
conscientious persons have advocated enactment of legislation to
make chemical tests compulsory. Others have urged that each driver
should submit to chemical-testing procedures by signing a written
waiver at the time he makes application for a license. However,
neither proposal is practical. A compulsory chemical-test law would
be doomed to failure in those jurisdictions where the judiciary chose
to decree that the privilege against self-incrimination applied to a
compulsory taking of physical evidence. And the second proposal
would not apply to unlicensed drivers and nonresident motorists
unless every state adopted such a provision and made the waiver
broad enough to cover submission to tests in other states.
A. Nature of the Statutes
In 1953 New York arrived at a happy solution in enacting the
first statute in this country requiring drivers to submit to a chemical
test for intoxication." Nationwide reaction has been generally favor-
able, and the Council of State Governments has recommended its
adoption by other states."
The nucleus of the New York law declares that any person oper-
ating a motor vehicle in the state shall be deemed to have given
his consent to a chemical test whenever the police suspect him of
driving while intoxicated 9 The mere operation of a motor vehicle
within the state, whether by a person licensed or unlicensed, resi-
suit. An injured motorist was taken to a physician's office for emergency treatment.
Called as a witness for the state, the physician testified that while the motorist was
in his office he observed his condition, and he expressed an opinion that the motor-
ist was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Noting that the weight of author-
ity would admit the doctor's testimony, the court ruled that the doctor was a com-
petent witness inasmuch as his observations and opinion relative thereto bore no
relation to curative treatment. State v. Townsend, 146 Kan. 982, 73 P.2d 1124
(1937).
97. N.Y. Laws 1953, ch. 854, N.Y. VEHcLE & TRAFIC LAW, § 71-a. For
an illuminating comment concerning the New York law, see Weinstein, Statute Com-
pelling Submission to a Chemical Test for Intoxication, 45 J. Cam. L., C. & P.S. 541
(1955).
98. The Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation, Program for
1954, 38-39 (1953); The Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legisla-
tion, Program for 1955, 61-62 (1954). The legislatures of three states have enacted
laws similar in purpose and in content to the New York implied consent law. See
IDAHO CODE ANN., § 49-353 (Supp. 1955); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN., § 8-1001 (Supp.
1957); UTAH CoDE ANN., § 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 1957). Provisions of the Kansas law
are nearly identical to provisions suggested by the Council of State Governments in
its 1954 report. The Kansas consent law drew favorable comment from the Supreme
Court of the United States in Breithaupt v. Abram, 342 U.S. 432, 436 (1956).
99. In 1954, the clause, "believe such person to have been driving" was amended
to read, "suspect such person of driving." N.Y. Laws 1954, ch. 320, effective
March 30, 1954, amending N.Y. VEmcrE & TRAmc LAw, § 71-a(1).
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dent or nonresident, constitutes consent to be tested. Implying
consent in advance, through the mere operation of a motor vehicle,
avoids the difficult consent problem, for even if the motorist is
rendered insensible by consumption of intoxicants or is unconscious
or dazed as a result of an accident or other mishap, he has consented
in advance to submission to a chemical-test procedure prescribed
by law. Without doubt some will assert that the test should not be
administered if the subject involved is not capable of giving intelli-
gent consent, but this point of view can only thwart the purpose
of the statute. It seems quite obvious that the legislatures of the
various states that have enacted consent statutes have intended
that tests should be administered in all cases where refusals were
not evident. This interpretation of the law in no way encourages
violence, and judging from the opinion of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the Breithaupt case, no overt violation of due
process is contemplated. In short, the statutory provision with re-
spect to automatic consent serves its most useful function in those
extreme situations where, because of injury or gross intoxication,
actual consent is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.
Paradoxically, however, the New York law also provides that,
although the driver has constructively consented to submit to a
chemical test, he may refuse to take the test despite his imputed
promise to consent. 00 If he refuses to submit and therefore does
not fulfill his implied agreement, he automatically forfeits the privi-
lege of using the highways of the state. In effect, therefore, he loses
his driver's license or nonresident operating privilege. This curious
juxtaposition of mandatory consent with a freedom of refusal pro-
vides further insurance against the unseemly struggles that are so
likely to arise when police and citizen fail to appreciate the import
of a common purpose.
B. Constitutionality of the Statutes
In Schutt v. Mac Duff,' the first case challenging the constitu-
tionality of the New York statute, an action was brought to annul
the revocation of petitioner's driver's license. The license was re-
voked by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for the alleged refusal
of the petitioner to submit to a blood test as demanded by a police
officer following an arrest for driving while intoxicated. Although it
was found unconstitutional on other grounds, the validity of the
statute was upheld against contentions that it violated the privilege
against self-incrimination, the court holding that New York deci-
sions have limited the effect of the state constitutional provision to
100. The Idaho, Kansas, and Utah statutes likewise permit the motorist the priv-
ilege of refusal. For citations, see note 98 supra.
101. 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
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protect only against testimonial compulsion.102 The court also re-
jected petitioner's claim that the implied consent statute encroached
upon the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure, pointing to the fact that the petitioner, who was under
legal arrest, could be searched for evidences of the crime for which
he was arrested.103 Without hesitation, the court rejected a claim
that the statute operated to deprive the petitioner of equal protec-
tion of the laws guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions,
stating that the law affected alike all persons similarly situated, that
is, persons licensed to operate motor vehicles upon the highways of
the state.
The court did, however, hold that the statute violated due process,
since it did not provide drivers with an opportunity to be heard on
all questions of law or fact. Conscientious approval could not be
given to a statute authorizing final revocation of a driver's license by
loose and informal procedure which left every motorist in the state
at the mercy of the commissioner and his assistants.104 In effect, the
court ruled that the statute, as written, provided for an arbitrary and
summary infringement upon the qualified rights of a free people. It
also held the statute unconstitutional in that it lacked a provision
limiting its application to cases where there has been a lawful ar-
rest.10 5 Objections, as outlined, were met by legislative amendment
permitting temporary suspension of a license without a hearing but
requiring a hearing prior to final revocation, and further requiring
that the subject be placed under arrest prior to being requested to
submit to a chemical test. 06
102. Id. at 122-23. The opinion indicated that the constitutional privilege would
not bar the use of chemical-test results, even though body fluids were taken while
defendant was in a confused or unconscious state.
103. New York adheres to the rule that illegally-seized evidence may be admitted.
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
104.
Approval may not be given to a statutory provision authorizing the final revo-
cation of a driver's license by loose and informal procedure for, if this were
permitted, every automobile driver in the state would be at the mercy of the
commissioner and his assistants without control in the legislative body from
which the delegated authority was received.
State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 270, 95 N.W.2d 6, 12 (1959).
105. Subsequent legislation in Idaho, Kansas, and Utah has included provision for
lawful arrest. See IDAHO CODE ANN., § 49-352 (Supp. 1955); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN., § 8-1001 (Supp. 1957); UTAH CODE ANN., § 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 1957). If a
person, having been placed under arrest, and having thereafter been requested to
submit to a chemical test, refuses to submit to such test, the test shall not be given.
In such event, license or permit to drive shall be revoked by a proper licensing
authority.
106. N.Y. Laws 1954, ch. 320, effective March 30, 1954, amending N.Y. V~nacrm
& Trvu c LAw, § 71-a(1). Statutory provisions as amended were held not to
violate due process on any theory. Ballou v. Kelly, 12 Misc. 2d 23, 176 N.Y.S.2d
1005 (Sup. Ct. 1958). The fact that the statute does not require a warning by
police to the effect that refusal to submit may result in revocation of one's driver's
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C. Comment Upon, or Admission Into Evidence of,
Refusal to Submit to Chemical Testing
When a motorist refuses to submit to a chemical test, may the
fact of refusal be admitted into evidence or be commented upon at
the trial by the prosecution? The decisions are not in agreement.
For example, California, Iowa, Ohio, South Carolina, and Virginia
have permitted comment, noting that there has been an increasing
tendency among the courts of many jurisdictions to extend the scope
of self-incrimination provisions to unwarranted lengths.07 However,
none of these cases involved interpretation of a statute granting an
accused the right of refusal to submit to a chemical test. On the
other hand, New York has held that evidence of the accused's
refusal to submit is inadmissible. 08 Furthermore, statutes of several
states specifically provide that evidence of refusal to submit to, or
of failure to take, the test shall not be admissible. 0 9
In State v. Severson,"01 the Supreme Court of North Dakota held
that a statute I" providing that the accused shall not be required
to submit to a chemical test without his consent implied that evi-
dence of the results of such test could not be admitted unless the
accused consented to the test. And an appellate division of the
Supreme Court of New York has noted that the New York courts
have consistently held that under the self-incrimination laws the
receipt of evidence in a criminal trial concerning a defendant's
complete silence or refusal to answer is reversible error."12 Thus, the
fact that a defendant did what he had an absolute right to do could
not be used to create an unfavorable inference against him.
license does not violate due process. Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143
N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955). On the other hand, the New York Court of Appeals
has indicated that it is better practice for police to notify the motorist of his rights
under the statute pertaining to refusal to submit. People v. Ward, 307 N.Y. 73, 120
N.E.2d 211 (1954).
107. People v. McGinnis, 123 Cal. App. 2d 945, 267 P.2d 458 (1953); State v.
Benson, 230 Iowa 1168, 300 N.W. 275 (1941); State v. Gatton, 60 Ohio App. 192,
20 N.E.2d 265 (1938); State v. Smith, 230 S.C. 154, 94 S.E.2d 886 (1956);
Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 81 S.E.2d 614 (1954); Annot., 175 A.L.R.
234, 240 (1948).
108. People v. Stratton, 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1955).
109. E.g., GA. CODE ANN., § 68-1625 (Rev. 1957); ME. RBv. STAT. ANN. ch. 22,§ 150 (Supp. 1957); ORE. REv. STAT., § 483.630 (1955); VA. CODE ANN., § 18-75.1
(Supp. 1958) (prohibits comment also); WAsH. Rlv. CODE, § 46.56.010 (1951).
Some states have held such evidence inadmissible on the basis of ordinances, State v.
Simonson, 252 Minn. 315, 89 N.W.2d 910 (1958), analogous statutes, Jordan v. State,
290 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956), or statutes merely prohibiting comment,
Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d 1103 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957).
110. 75 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1956). The North Dakota court cited no supporting
authority.
111. N.D. REv. CODE, § 39-0801 (Supp. 1957). See comment on consent require-
ments in text at notes 48--52 supra.
112. People v. Stratton, 286 App. Div. 323, 142 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1955).
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Recently, however, the Supreme Court of Idaho emphatically
declared that evidence of refusal to submit to a blood test was
competent and admissible."' Like any other act or statement volun-
tarily made, it was competent for the jury to consider and weigh
the fact of refusal with the other evidence, and to draw from it
whatever inference as to guilt or innocence might be justified under
the circumstances. Comparing the North Dakota and Idaho statutes,
the court pointed out that under Idaho law, by operating a motor
vehicle within the state, the defendant is deemed to have given his
consent to a chemical test." The court also took notice of an Idaho
statute which prohibited comment when a defendant in a criminal
action neglected or refused to testify, but held that statute inapplic-
able in the instant case, because it applied to a defendant only as a
witness and guarded against testimonial compulsion, not against
real evidence." 5
Despite the fact that modem legislation has granted the arrested
motorist the privilege of refusal, it does not necessarily follow that
comment upon refusal will work undue hardship when the motorist
stands accused at trial. Furthermore, if it be admitted that the
privilege of refusal stems from a legislative effort to eliminate unrea-
sonable force in terms of police action, the accused has received all
benefits due him when he is granted merely the right of refusal. For
the sake of peace and order, the state has surrendered evidence of
significant value, and beneficence at the sacrifice of effective law
enforcement should not be compounded by denying the state the
privilege of comment. Far from being unduly prejudicial to the
defendant's cause, any diminution in value of the privilege of re-
fusal by allowing comment will be comparatively slight. Taking
account of recent legislative efforts aimed at safeguarding individual
liberties and discouraging coercive police measures, it would be
most impractical to insist that successful prosecution be curtailed by
an unnecessary and unrealistic prohibition of comment.
113. State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958).
114. IDAro CODE ANN., § 49-353 (Supp. 1955).
115. IDAHO CODE AwN., § 19-3003 (1947).
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